Strong dictatorship via ratio-scale measurable utilities: a simpler proof

DOI10.1007/S40505-023-00244-8zbMATH Open1520.91169OpenAlexW4360979491MaRDI QIDQ6164130FDOQ6164130

Authors: Jacob M. Nebel 

Publication date: 27 July 2023

Published in: Economic Theory Bulletin (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-023-00244-8

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zbMATH Keywords

Arrow's impossibility theoremsocial welfare orderingsinformational invariance conditionsratio-scale measurabilitystrong dictatorship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Social Choice with Interpersonal Utility Comparisons: A Diagrammatic Introduction
• Social welfare orderings for ratio-scale measurable utilities
• Measurement scales and welfarist social choice
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (3)

• Existence of a dictatorial subgroup in social choice with independent subgroup utility scales, an alternative proof
• Only a dictatorship is efficient
• Extensive measurement in social choice

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