Strong dictatorship via ratio-scale measurable utilities: a simpler proof

DOI10.1007/S40505-023-00244-8MaRDI QIDQ6164130zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jacob M. Nebel

Publication date 27 July 2023

Published in Economic Theory Bulletin (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-023-00244-8

zbMATH Keywords

Arrow's impossibility theoremsocial welfare orderingsinformational invariance conditionsratio-scale measurabilitystrong dictatorship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Welfare economics (91B15)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784638 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3366923 (Why is no real title available?)
• Measurement scales and welfarist social choice
• Social Choice with Interpersonal Utility Comparisons: A Diagrammatic Introduction
• Social choice and individual values
• Social welfare orderings for ratio-scale measurable utilities

Cited in

(3)

• Existence of a dictatorial subgroup in social choice with independent subgroup utility scales, an alternative proof
• Only a dictatorship is efficient
• Extensive measurement in social choice

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