Only a dictatorship is efficient

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.02.010MaRDI QIDQ608534zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jean-Pierre Benoît, Lewis A. Kornhauser

Publication date 25 November 2010

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.010

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

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Cites work

• Ensuring Pareto optimality by referendum voting
• Multi-issue bargaining with endogenous agenda
• On constructing a generalized Ostrogorski paradox: Necessary and sufficient conditions
• On the separability of assembly preferences
• Social choice and individual values
• The ostrogorski paradox and its relation to nontransitive choice
• The paradox of multiple elections

Cited in

(7)

• Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains
• When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
• Compromise in combinatorial vote
• Dictatorship versus manipulability
• Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum
• Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule
• Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda

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