Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum
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Recommendations
- Ensuring Pareto optimality by referendum voting
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- On Pareto-optimality in the cross-efficiency evaluation
- Optimal majority rule in referenda
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 992411
- Dual Pareto efficiency
- Condorcet efficiency of simple voting rules for large electorates
- Pareto Optimality
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1414348 (Why is no real title available?)
- Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox
- Ensuring Pareto optimality by referendum voting
- How does separability affect the desirability of referendum election outcomes?
- On constructing a generalized Ostrogorski paradox: Necessary and sufficient conditions
- On the separability of assembly preferences
- Only a dictatorship is efficient
- Separable discrete preferences
- Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox
- Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
- The Ostrogorski paradox
- The paradox of multiple elections
Cited in
(7)- Policies over time and Pareto optimality
- Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule
- Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot?
- Compromise in combinatorial vote
- Ensuring Pareto optimality by referendum voting
- When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
- On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda
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