Metric rationalization of social welfare functions
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Publication:477780
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2014.10.001zbMATH Open1308.91051OpenAlexW1995139670MaRDI QIDQ477780FDOQ477780
Authors: Aurelien Y. Mekuko, Issofa Moyouwou, Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga 
Publication date: 9 December 2014
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.10.001
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Cites Work
- Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules
- The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment
- Some measures of closeness to unanimity and their implications
- Voting rules as statistical estimators
- Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
- Transitive closure, proximity and intransitivities
- Social compromise and social metrics
- Metric rationalisation of social choice functions according to principles of social choice
Cited In (9)
- Representations of votes facilitating monotonicity-based ranking rules: from votrix to votex
- Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules
- Hyper-stable social welfare functions
- On metrically conservative societies
- Does avoiding bad voting rules result in good ones?
- Social welfare functions which preserve distances
- Representations of votes based on pairwise information: monotonicity versus consistency
- Metric rationalisation of social choice functions according to principles of social choice
- Monotonicity-based consensus states for the monometric rationalisation of ranking rules and how they are affected by ties
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