An impossibility theorem for amalgamating evidence
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3823440 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3216776 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation
- Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens
- Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine–Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens
- Corroboration and auxiliary hypotheses: Duhem's thesis revisited
- Dynamic doxastic logic: why, how, and where to?
- How Bayesian confirmation theory handles the paradox of the ravens
- Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and relational confirmation
- Social choice and individual values
- Statistical Evidence
- The Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses
- Three brief proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem
Cited in
(7)- The limitations of the Arrovian consistency of domains with a fixed preference
- No evidence amalgamation without evidence measurement
- The variety-of-evidence thesis: a Bayesian exploration of its surprising failures
- Impossibility in belief merging
- Arrow's decisive coalitions
- Dependence and Independence in Social Choice: Arrow’s Theorem
- Arrow's theorem and theory choice
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