Impossibility in belief merging

From MaRDI portal
Publication:1680693

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2017.06.003zbMATH Open1419.68123arXiv1606.04589OpenAlexW2964160859MaRDI QIDQ1680693FDOQ1680693


Authors: Amílcar Mata Díaz, Ramón Pino Pérez Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 16 November 2017

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: With the aim of studying social properties of belief merging and having a better understanding of impossibility, we extend in three ways the framework of logic-based merging introduced by Konieczny and Pino P'erez. First, at the level of representation of the information, we pass from belief bases to complex epistemic states. Second, the profiles are represented as functions of finite societies to the set of epistemic states (a sort of vectors) and not as multisets of epistemic states. Third, we extend the set of rational postulates in order to consider the epistemic versions of the classical postulates of Social Choice Theory: Standard Domain, Pareto Property, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Absence of Dictator. These epistemic versions of social postulates are given, essentially, in terms of the finite propositional logic. We state some representation theorems for these operators. These extensions and representation theorems allow us to establish an epistemic and very general version of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. One of the interesting features of our result, is that it holds for different representations of epistemic states; for instance conditionals, Ordinal Conditional functions and, of course, total preorders.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.04589




Recommendations




Cites Work


Cited In (7)





This page was built for publication: Impossibility in belief merging

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1680693)