Impossibility in belief merging

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2017.06.003MaRDI QIDQ1680693zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Amílcar Mata Díaz, Ramón Pino Pérez

Publication date 16 November 2017

Published in Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.04589

zbMATH Keywords

Arrow's impossibility theoremepistemic statesbelief merging

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27)

Abstract: With the aim of studying social properties of belief merging and having a better understanding of impossibility, we extend in three ways the framework of logic-based merging introduced by Konieczny and Pino P'erez. First, at the level of representation of the information, we pass from belief bases to complex epistemic states. Second, the profiles are represented as functions of finite societies to the set of epistemic states (a sort of vectors) and not as multisets of epistemic states. Third, we extend the set of rational postulates in order to consider the epistemic versions of the classical postulates of Social Choice Theory: Standard Domain, Pareto Property, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Absence of Dictator. These epistemic versions of social postulates are given, essentially, in terms of the finite propositional logic. We state some representation theorems for these operators. These extensions and representation theorems allow us to establish an epistemic and very general version of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. One of the interesting features of our result, is that it holds for different representations of epistemic states; for instance conditionals, Ordinal Conditional functions and, of course, total preorders.

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Cited in

(7)

• Logic-based fusion of complex epistemic states
• An impossibility theorem for amalgamating evidence
• On manipulation in merging epistemic states
• Impossibility of gathering, a certification
• Merging epistemic states and manipulation
• The epistemic view of belief merging: can we track the truth?
• Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions

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