How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens

DOI10.1007/978-90-481-3615-5_11zbMath1217.60005OpenAlexW2120414033MaRDI QIDQ2997006

Branden Fitelson, James Hawthorne

Publication date: 6 May 2011

Published in: The Place of Probability in Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3615-5_11

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Foundations of probability theory (60A99) Axioms; other general questions in probability (60A05)

Related Items (10)

Resolving the Raven Paradox: Simple Random Sampling, Stratified Random Sampling, and Inference to Best Explanation ⋮ An impossibility theorem for amalgamating evidence ⋮ Revamping hypothetico-deductivism: A dialectic account of confirmation ⋮ A synthesis of Hempelian and hypothetico-deductive confirmation ⋮ The raven paradox revisited in terms of random variables ⋮ On the truth-conduciveness of coherence ⋮ Does the Bayesian solution to the paradox of confirmation really support Bayesianism? ⋮ A DECISION PROCEDURE FOR PROBABILITY CALCULUS WITH APPLICATIONS ⋮ Confirmation and the ordinal equivalence thesis ⋮ Goodman's ``new riddle

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