How Bayesian confirmation theory handles the paradox of the ravens

DOI10.1007/978-90-481-3615-5_11zbMATH Open1217.60005OpenAlexW2120414033MaRDI QIDQ2997006FDOQ2997006

Authors: Branden Fitelson, James Hawthorne 

Publication date: 6 May 2011

Published in: The Place of Probability in Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3615-5_11

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Axioms; other general questions in probability (60A05) Foundations of probability theory (60A99)

Cited In (15)

• An impossibility theorem for amalgamating evidence
• Does the Bayesian solution to the paradox of confirmation really support Bayesianism?
• Bayesianism, Ravens, and Evidential Relevance
• Resolving the Raven Paradox: Simple Random Sampling, Stratified Random Sampling, and Inference to Best Explanation
• Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution
• Confirmation and the ordinal equivalence thesis
• A synthesis of Hempelian and hypothetico-deductive confirmation
• Revamping hypothetico-deductivism: A dialectic account of confirmation
• The raven paradox revisited in terms of random variables
• On the truth-conduciveness of coherence
• The Selective Confirmation Answer to the Paradox of the Ravens
• The ``raven paradox in the light of probability theory
• Goodman's ``new riddle
• Once more to dissolve the ravens
• A decision procedure for probability calculus with applications

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