Bayesianism, Ravens, and Evidential Relevance

DOI10.4288/JAFPOS1956.13.1zbMATH Open1082.03501OpenAlexW2088710754MaRDI QIDQ3374792FDOQ3374792

Authors: Robert T. Pennock 

Publication date: 22 February 2006

Published in: Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.4288/jafpos1956.13.1

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zbMATH Keywords

paradox of the ravensBayesian evidence relationevidential relevance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Cited In (6)

• Does the Bayesian solution to the paradox of confirmation really support Bayesianism?
• Resolving the Raven Paradox: Simple Random Sampling, Stratified Random Sampling, and Inference to Best Explanation
• Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution
• Bayesian thought in early modern detective stories: Monsieur Lecoq, C. Auguste Dupin and Sherlock Holmes
• How Bayesian confirmation theory handles the paradox of the ravens
• Once more to dissolve the ravens

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