Bayesianism, Ravens, and Evidential Relevance

DOI10.4288/JAFPOS1956.13.1MaRDI QIDQ3374792zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Robert T. Pennock

Publication date 22 February 2006

Published in Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.4288/jafpos1956.13.1

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian evidence relationevidential relevanceparadox of the ravens

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Probability and inductive logic (03B48)

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(9)

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• Once more to dissolve the ravens
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• Does the Bayesian solution to the paradox of confirmation really support Bayesianism?
• Bayesian thought in early modern detective stories: Monsieur Lecoq, C. Auguste Dupin and Sherlock Holmes

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