Does the Bayesian solution to the paradox of confirmation really support Bayesianism?

DOI10.1007/S13194-010-0007-1zbMATH Open1348.62011OpenAlexW2064374748MaRDI QIDQ693099FDOQ693099

Authors: Brian Laetz 

Publication date: 7 December 2012

Published in: European Journal for Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-010-0007-1

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• Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution
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zbMATH Keywords

BayesianismCarl Hempelparadox of confirmationparadox of the ravens

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01) Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Probability and inductive logic (03B48)

Cites Work

• I.—STUDIES IN THE LOGIC OF CONFIRMATION (I.)
• How Bayesian confirmation theory handles the paradox of the ravens
• Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution

Cited In (5)

• Do Bayesians Learn Their Way Out of Ambiguity?
• Bayesianism, Ravens, and Evidential Relevance
• The tacking by disjunction paradox: Bayesianism versus hypothetico-deductivism
• Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution
• How Bayesian confirmation theory handles the paradox of the ravens

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