I.—STUDIES IN THE LOGIC OF CONFIRMATION (I.)

Cited in

(44)

Hempel, Grue and the logical empiricist baseline
On the empirical equivalence between special relativity and Lorentz's ether theory
The Bayesian logic of frequency-based conjunction fallacies
HOW DOES NEW EVIDENCE CHANGE OUR ESTIMATES OF PROBABILITIES? CARNAP'S FORMULA REVISITED
Fuzzy confirmation measures
Does the Bayesian solution to the paradox of confirmation really support Bayesianism?
Properties of rule interestingness measures and alternative approaches to normalization of measures
Three ways of being non-material
Explication defended
Inductive logic
A probabilistic approach to analyzing agent relations in three-way conflict analysis based on Bayesian confirmation
Carnap on empirical significance
The logic of theory assessment
Resolving the Raven Paradox: Simple Random Sampling, Stratified Random Sampling, and Inference to Best Explanation
Inductive systematization: Definition and a critical survey
Solomonoff induction violates Nicod's criterion
Deductively definable logics of induction
Evidence, significance, and counterfactuals: Schramm on the new riddle of induction
Anything confirms anything?
Formal methods in the philosophy of science
Evidence, hypothesis, and grue
On the justification problems: towards a Peircean diagnosis and solution
Proper bootstrapping
Assessing theories, Bayes style
Revamping hypothetico-deductivism: A dialectic account of confirmation
The raven paradox revisited in terms of random variables
What is Bayesian confirmation for?
Multicriteria Attractiveness Evaluation of Decision and Association Rules
The Selective Confirmation Answer to the Paradox of the Ravens
Unity as an epistemic virtue
A computational learning semantics for inductive empirical knowledge
A Survey of Ranking Theory
The transmission of support: a Bayesian re-analysis
Goodman's ``new riddle
Monotonic variable consistency rough set approaches
Why inference to the best explanation doesn't secure empirical grounds for mathematical Platonism
Ramsification and inductive inference
On the paradox of confirmation
Metaconfirmation
Analyzing differentiable fuzzy logic operators
Reasoning about evidence
Varieties of modal (classificatory) and comparative probability
Quantifier probability logic and the confirmation paradox
The logic of epistemic justification

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