I.—STUDIES IN THE LOGIC OF CONFIRMATION (I.)

Cited In (44)

On the empirical equivalence between special relativity and Lorentz's ether theory
HOW DOES NEW EVIDENCE CHANGE OUR ESTIMATES OF PROBABILITIES? CARNAP'S FORMULA REVISITED
The Bayesian logic of frequency-based conjunction fallacies
Fuzzy confirmation measures
Does the Bayesian solution to the paradox of confirmation really support Bayesianism?
Properties of rule interestingness measures and alternative approaches to normalization of measures
Three ways of being non-material
Explication defended
Inductive logic
A probabilistic approach to analyzing agent relations in three-way conflict analysis based on Bayesian confirmation
Carnap on empirical significance
Resolving the Raven Paradox: Simple Random Sampling, Stratified Random Sampling, and Inference to Best Explanation
The logic of theory assessment
Inductive systematization: Definition and a critical survey
Solomonoff induction violates Nicod's criterion
Deductively definable logics of induction
Anything confirms anything?
Evidence, significance, and counterfactuals: Schramm on the new riddle of induction
Formal methods in the philosophy of science
On the justification problems: towards a Peircean diagnosis and solution
Evidence, hypothesis, and grue
Proper bootstrapping
Assessing theories, Bayes style
What is Bayesian confirmation for?
Revamping hypothetico-deductivism: A dialectic account of confirmation
The raven paradox revisited in terms of random variables
The Selective Confirmation Answer to the Paradox of the Ravens
Multicriteria Attractiveness Evaluation of Decision and Association Rules
A computational learning semantics for inductive empirical knowledge
Unity as an epistemic virtue
A Survey of Ranking Theory
The transmission of support: a Bayesian re-analysis
Goodman's ``new riddle
Monotonic variable consistency rough set approaches
Why inference to the best explanation doesn't secure empirical grounds for mathematical Platonism
On the paradox of confirmation
Ramsification and inductive inference
Metaconfirmation
Analyzing differentiable fuzzy logic operators
Reasoning about evidence
Varieties of modal (classificatory) and comparative probability
Quantifier probability logic and the confirmation paradox
The logic of epistemic justification
Hempel, Grue and the logical empiricist baseline

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