The logic of epistemic justification

DOI10.1007/s11229-017-1422-zzbMath1474.03049OpenAlexW2611956805WikidataQ59614575 ScholiaQ59614575MaRDI QIDQ2666893

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 23 November 2021

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1422-z

zbMATH Keywords

probabilityjustificationnormalcynormic theoryrisk minimisation theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Cites Work

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• Ceteris paribus conditionals and comparative normalcy
• What does a conditional knowledge base entail?
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• The epistemic account of ceteris paribus conditions
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• When Other Things Aren't Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws from Vacuity
• Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis
• Generalizing the Lottery Paradox
• I.—STUDIES IN THE LOGIC OF CONFIRMATION (I.)

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