Solomonoff induction violates Nicod's criterion
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Publication:2835642
Abstract: Nicod's criterion states that observing a black raven is evidence for the hypothesis H that all ravens are black. We show that Solomonoff induction does not satisfy Nicod's criterion: there are time steps in which observing black ravens decreases the belief in H. Moreover, while observing any computable infinite string compatible with H, the belief in H decreases infinitely often when using the unnormalized Solomonoff prior, but only finitely often when using the normalized Solomonoff prior. We argue that the fault is not with Solomonoff induction; instead we should reject Nicod's criterion.
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3489017 (Why is no real title available?)
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- I.—STUDIES IN THE LOGIC OF CONFIRMATION (I.)
- Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information
- New error bounds for Solomonoff prediction
- On the relation between descriptional complexity and algorithmic probability
- On universal prediction and Bayesian confirmation
- Probability Theory
- The generalized radially symmetric wave equation
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