On the truth-conduciveness of coherence
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Publication:488373
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5080874 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3060434 (Why is no real title available?)
- A probabilistic theory of coherence
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- Against probabilistic measures of coherence
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- Coherence as generalized logical equivalence
- Coherence of the contents and the transmission of probabilistic support
- Equivalent testimonies as a touchstone of coherence measures
- Focused Correlation and Confirmation
- Further results on the intransitivity of evidential support
- How Bayesian confirmation theory handles the paradox of the ravens
- Measuring coherence
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- On the alleged impossibility of coherence
- Problems with priors in probabilistic measures of coherence
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- The Relevance Criterion of Confirmation
- The defeasible nature of coherentist justification
- The impossibility of coherence
- The transmission of support: a Bayesian re-analysis
- Transitivity and intransitivity in evidential support: some further results
- Warrant and Accidentally True Belief
- Weak Bayesian coherentism
- Why does coherence appear truth-conducive?
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Cited in
(9)- The impossibility of coherence
- Evidential support, transitivity, and screening-off
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- On the alleged impossibility of coherence
- Ways in which coherence is confirmation conducive
- Coherence and the truth connection
- Coherence of the contents and the transmission of probabilistic support
- The problem of coherence and truth redux
- Why does coherence appear truth-conducive?
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