Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens

DOI10.1093/BJPS/AXI117MaRDI QIDQ5703288zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Branden Fitelson, Andrew Waterman

Publication date 8 November 2005

Published in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axi117

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Philosophy of mathematics (00A30)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(7)

• Fitch's paradox and probabilistic antirealism
• Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine–Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens
• The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson and Waterman
• Duhem's problem revisited: logical versus epistemic formulations and solutions
• An impossibility theorem for amalgamating evidence
• Corroboration and auxiliary hypotheses: Duhem's thesis revisited
• The Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses

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