Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens

DOI10.1093/bjps/axi117zbMath1124.00005OpenAlexW1998347221MaRDI QIDQ5703288

Branden Fitelson, Andrew Waterman

Publication date: 8 November 2005

Published in: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axi117

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Probability and inductive logic (03B48)

Related Items (4)

Corroboration and auxiliary hypotheses: Duhem's thesis revisited ⋮ An impossibility theorem for amalgamating evidence ⋮ Fitch's paradox and probabilistic antirealism ⋮ Duhem's problem revisited: logical versus epistemic formulations and solutions

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