Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens

DOI10.1093/BJPS/AXI117zbMATH Open1124.00005OpenAlexW1998347221MaRDI QIDQ5703288FDOQ5703288

Authors: Branden Fitelson, Andrew Waterman 

Publication date: 8 November 2005

Published in: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axi117

Recommendations

• Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine–Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens
• The Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses
• The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson and Waterman
• Corroboration and auxiliary hypotheses: Duhem's thesis revisited
• The tacking by disjunction paradox: Bayesianism versus hypothetico-deductivism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Philosophy of mathematics (00A30)

Cited In (7)

• An impossibility theorem for amalgamating evidence
• Corroboration and auxiliary hypotheses: Duhem's thesis revisited
• Fitch's paradox and probabilistic antirealism
• The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson and Waterman
• Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine–Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens
• The Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses
• Duhem's problem revisited: logical versus epistemic formulations and solutions

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