Arrovian theorems with private alternatives domains and selfish individuals

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90020-3zbMath0677.90003MaRDI QIDQ1123789

Michel Le Breton, Georges Bordes

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90020-3

zbMATH Keywords

impossibility theorems; hypersaturating domains; divisible public goods; private alternatives sets; saturating domains

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Can equity be purchased at the expense of efficiency? An axiomatic inquiry, Arrovian theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods, Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle, Arrow's theorem for economic environments and effective social preferences, Social welfare functions on restricted economic domains, Quasitransitive intergenerational choice for economic environments, Welfarism on economic domains, Aggregating ordinal probabilities on finite sets, Wilson's theorem for economic environments and continuous social preferences, Social choice and the indexing dilemma, Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?, Arrovian theorems for economic domains: Assignments, matchings and pairings, Range convexity, continuity, and strategy-proofness of voting schemes

Cites Work

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