Arrovian theorems with private alternatives domains and selfish individuals

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90020-3zbMATH Open0677.90003OpenAlexW1984753039MaRDI QIDQ1123789FDOQ1123789

Authors: Georges Bordes, Michel Le Breton 

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90020-3

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zbMATH Keywords

impossibility theoremshypersaturating domainsdivisible public goodsprivate alternatives setssaturating domains

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
• Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions
• Social welfare functions for economic environments with and without the Pareto principle
• Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting Arrow social welfare functions

Cited In (21)

• Arrovian theorems for economic domains: Assignments, matchings and pairings
• Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?
• John A. Weymark
• Consequences, opportunities, and Arrovian impossibility theorems with consequentialist domains
• Wilson's theorem for economic environments and continuous social preferences
• Arrovian theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods
• Can equity be purchased at the expense of efficiency? An axiomatic inquiry
• Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives
• Arrow's theorem for economic environments and effective social preferences
• Range convexity, continuity, and strategy-proofness of voting schemes
• Social choice and the indexing dilemma
• Social welfare functions on restricted economic domains
• Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle
• Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Aggregate risk and the Pareto principle
• Welfarism on economic domains
• Quasitransitive intergenerational choice for economic environments
• Aggregating ordinal probabilities on finite sets
• Arrow theorems in mixed goods, stochastic, and dynamic economic environments
• Arrow's theorem in public good environments with convex technologies

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