Arrovian theorems with private alternatives domains and selfish individuals
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Publication:1123789
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90020-3zbMath0677.90003OpenAlexW1984753039MaRDI QIDQ1123789
Georges Bordes, Michel Le Breton
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90020-3
impossibility theoremshypersaturating domainsdivisible public goodsprivate alternatives setssaturating domains
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Cites Work
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- Social welfare functions for economic environments with and without the Pareto principle
- Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting Arrow social welfare functions
- Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
- Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
- Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
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