The paper deals with the evaluation of public policies, where scenarios that are affected by purely idiosyncratic risks are clearly distinguished from those in which correlated risks are present, as risks associated with catastrophic pandemics or systemic failures of a financial system. Since this important distinction is not captured by standard utilitarian aggregators, the authors deepen and revisit Harsanyi's theory of preferences aggregation, in order to obtain a new parsimonious generalization of utilitarianism. The idea that inspires this study stems from the need to avoid the rigidity of specific regulatory considerations for or against aggregate risk, but rather to create a scheme that incorporates sensitivity to correlation based on few ``transparent principles.
- A biological basis for expected and non-expected utility
- A Fairness Justification of Utilitarianism
- A Note on Fine and Tight Qualitative Probabilities
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
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- Agreeing probability measures for comparative probability structures
- An abstract law of large numbers
- Arrovian theorems with private alternatives domains and selfish individuals
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- Choice under aggregate uncertainty
- Equally-distributed equivalent utility, ex post egalitarianism and utilitarianism
- Generalized utilitarianism and Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem
- Harsanyi's utilitarianism theorems: General societies
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- Impartiality: Definition and Representation
- Inefficient Credit Booms
- Inequality aversion and separability in social risk evaluation
- Large games and the law of large numbers
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- Multiattribute utility theory, intertemporal utility, and correlation aversion
- Relative Utilitarianism
- Social choice and individual values
- Social welfare functions for economic environments with and without the Pareto principle
- Substitution, Risk Aversion, and the Temporal Behavior of Consumption and Asset Returns: A Theoretical Framework
- The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables
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