More on Harsanyi's utilitarian cardinal welfare theorem
If individuals and society both obey the expected utility hypothesis and social alternatives are uncertain, then the social utility must be a linear combination of the individual utilities, provided the society is indifferent when all its members are. This result was first proven by \textit{J. Harsanyi} [J. Polit. Econ. 63, 309-321 (1955)] who made implicit assumptions in the proof not actually needed for the result [see \textit{M. D. Resnick}, Theory Decis. 15, 309-320 (1983; Zbl 0519.90015)]. This note presents a straightforward proof of Harsanyi's theorem based on a separating hyperplane argument.
- Two variants of Harsanyi's aggregation theorem
- Harsanyi's aggregation theorem without selfish preferences
- Consequentialist demographic norms and parenting rights
- Social choice theory in the case of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities
- Cost-benefit analysis, benefit accounting and fuzzy decisions. I: Theory
- Harsanyi's utilitarianism theorems: General societies
- Equilibria of nonparacompact generalized games with \(\mathcal L_{F_c}\)-majorized correspondences in \(G\)-convex spaces.
- New fixed-point theorems for two maps and applications to problems on sets with convex sections and minimax inequalities
- Aggregation theory for SSB utility functionals
- Note on generalized bi-quasi-variational inequalities
- Harsanyi's utilitarianism via linear programming
- Utilitarianism with and without expected utility
- Social decision for a measure society
- Aggregate risk and the Pareto principle
- Tit for tat: foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings
- Maximum theorems with strict quasi-concavity and applications
- Measurement theory and the foundations of utilitarianism
- Equilibria of nonparacompact generalized games with L_c-majorized correspondences in FC-spaces
- Bolker-Jeffrey Expected Utility Theory and Axiomatic Utilitarianism
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910828 (Why is no real title available?)
- Temptation and guilt
- A theorem for Bayesian group decisions
- On Harsanyi's utilitarian cardinal welfare theorem
- Deriving Harsanyi's utilitarianism from de Finetti's book-making argument
This page was built for publication: More on Harsanyi's utilitarian cardinal welfare theorem
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1083994)
