More on Harsanyi's utilitarian cardinal welfare theorem (Q1083994)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3978748
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| English | More on Harsanyi's utilitarian cardinal welfare theorem |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3978748 |
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More on Harsanyi's utilitarian cardinal welfare theorem (English)
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1985
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If individuals and society both obey the expected utility hypothesis and social alternatives are uncertain, then the social utility must be a linear combination of the individual utilities, provided the society is indifferent when all its members are. This result was first proven by \textit{J. Harsanyi} [J. Polit. Econ. 63, 309-321 (1955)] who made implicit assumptions in the proof not actually needed for the result [see \textit{M. D. Resnick}, Theory Decis. 15, 309-320 (1983; Zbl 0519.90015)]. This note presents a straightforward proof of Harsanyi's theorem based on a separating hyperplane argument.
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expected utility hypothesis
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separating hyperplane
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0.9337978363037108
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0.8660147786140442
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0.8514029383659363
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0.8441048860549927
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