Consequences, opportunities, and Arrovian impossibility theorems with consequentialist domains

DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0338-4zbMATH Open1183.91049OpenAlexW2019503307MaRDI QIDQ733799FDOQ733799

Yukinori Iwata

Publication date: 19 October 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0338-4

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zbMATH Keywords

Arrovian social choiceextended preferencesextended social welfare function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice
• Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
• Characterizations of consequentialism and nonconsequentialism
• Consequences, opportunities, and generalized consequentialism and non-consequentialism.
• Welfarist-consequentialism, similarity of attitudes, and Arrow's general impossibility theorem
• Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation
• A variant of non-consequentialism and its characterization
• Arrovian theorems with private alternatives domains and selfish individuals
• The Bordes-LeBreton exceptional case
• Ranking opportunity sets on the basis of their freedom of choice and their ability to satisfy preferences: a difficulty
• Extended preferences and freedom of choice
• Arrovian theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods

Cited In (3)

• Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making
• Consequences, opportunities, and generalized consequentialism and non-consequentialism.
• Welfarist-consequentialism, similarity of attitudes, and Arrow's general impossibility theorem

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