Consequences, opportunities, and Arrovian impossibility theorems with consequentialist domains
The author examines the possibility of Arrovian social choice when alternatives consist of outcomes and opportunity sets from which they are chosen. Consequentialism is a choice attitude towards outcomes and opportunities for choice and prioritizes outcomes rather than opportunities for choice. He first proposes a sufficient condition for a restricted domain on which Arrow's impossibility theorem holds. A domain such that there exists a similarity of choice attitudes within consequentialism satisfies the proposed domain condition. He observes that a diversity of choice attitudes within consequentialism is crucial to resolve an Arrovian impossibility, but this resolution is restricted in plausibility. He re-examines \textit{K. Suzumura} and \textit{Y. Xu's} [Soc. Choice Welfare 22, No. 1, 237--251 (2004; Zbl 1077.91020)] framework by focusing on the properties of a domain in which an extended social welfare function (ESWF) is defined.
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