Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice

DOI10.1007/S00355-005-0028-4zbMATH Open1102.91031OpenAlexW1997759767MaRDI QIDQ2432499FDOQ2432499

Authors: Toyotaka Sakai, Masaki Shimoji 

Publication date: 25 October 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0028-4

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zbMATH Keywords

preferencesocial choicesocial welfare function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
• Dictators on blocks: Generalizations of social choice impossibility theorems
• The Simple Majority Decision Rule
• Welfarist-consequentialism, similarity of attitudes, and Arrow's general impossibility theorem

Cited In (14)

• The limitations of the Arrovian consistency of domains with a fixed preference
• Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making
• Plural identities and preference formation
• Arrovian social choice with psychological thresholds
• Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
• Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
• On strategy-proof social choice under categorization
• Consequences, opportunities, and Arrovian impossibility theorems with consequentialist domains
• Restricted preference domains in social choice: two perspectives
• Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures
• Nondictatorial social welfare functions with different discrimination structures
• The possibility of group choice: pairwise comparisons and merging functions
• Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
• The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination

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