Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice

DOI10.1007/S00355-005-0028-4MaRDI QIDQ2432499zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Toyotaka Sakai, Masaki Shimoji

Publication date 25 October 2006

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0028-4

zbMATH Keywords

preferencesocial choicesocial welfare function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Review text

This article investigates social preference spaces where the individual preferences are restricted to subsets of best options. With such restrictions the authors find conditions to avoid Arrow's impossibility. One of these conditions is that the restriction cuts be different for different individuals.

Recommendations

• Nondictatorial social welfare functions with different discrimination structures
• A comment on Arrow's impossibility theorem
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2190132
• Intransitive social strict preference and the Arrow theorem
• Consequences, opportunities, and Arrovian impossibility theorems with consequentialist domains

Cites work

• A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
• Dictators on blocks: Generalizations of social choice impossibility theorems
• The Simple Majority Decision Rule
• Welfarist-consequentialism, similarity of attitudes, and Arrow's general impossibility theorem

Cited in

(14)

• Nondictatorial social welfare functions with different discrimination structures
• Restricted preference domains in social choice: two perspectives
• Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
• Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making
• The limitations of the Arrovian consistency of domains with a fixed preference
• The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination
• Arrovian social choice with psychological thresholds
• Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
• Plural identities and preference formation
• On strategy-proof social choice under categorization
• The possibility of group choice: pairwise comparisons and merging functions
• Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
• Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures
• Consequences, opportunities, and Arrovian impossibility theorems with consequentialist domains

This page was built for publication: Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2432499)