Arrovian theorems for economic domains: Assignments, matchings and pairings

DOI10.1007/BF01395721MaRDI QIDQ2640416zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michel Le Breton, Georges Bordes

Publication date 1990

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01395721

zbMATH Keywords

assignmentsmatchingssymmetric domainssymmetric permutation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A note on the strong core of a market with indivisible goods
• Arrovian theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods
• Arrovian theorems with private alternatives domains and selfish individuals
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• On cores and indivisibility
• Social welfare functions for economic environments with and without the Pareto principle
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(7)

• Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
• The relationship between Arrow's and Wilson's theorems on restricted domains
• Preference aggregation for couples
• Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
• Abelian symmetry groups in social choice
• Simple Arrow-type propositions in the Edgeworth domain
• Ordinal simplicity in discrete mechanism design

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