Arrovian theorems for economic domains: Assignments, matchings and pairings
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Publication:2640416
DOI10.1007/BF01395721zbMath0719.90005OpenAlexW1976220156MaRDI QIDQ2640416
Michel Le Breton, Georges Bordes
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01395721
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Cites Work
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