Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice
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Publication:2516129
DOI10.1007/s00355-014-0868-xzbMath1341.91069OpenAlexW1972522073MaRDI QIDQ2516129
Publication date: 11 August 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0868-x
Related Items (7)
Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences ⋮ A characterization of unanimity with status quo: fixed vs variable population ⋮ On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives ⋮ Upper set rules with binary ranges ⋮ Solidarity and efficiency in preference aggregation: a tale of two rules ⋮ Solidarity in preference aggregation: improving on a status quo ⋮ A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model
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