On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives
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Publication:370963
DOI10.1007/s10058-013-0146-xzbMath1273.91139OpenAlexW2028179284WikidataQ58341355 ScholiaQ58341355MaRDI QIDQ370963
Publication date: 20 September 2013
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/36226
Related Items (4)
Beyond neutrality: extended difference of votes rules ⋮ On the manipulability of equitable voting rules ⋮ Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice ⋮ A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model
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