On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives

DOI10.1007/S10058-013-0146-XzbMATH Open1273.91139OpenAlexW2028179284WikidataQ58341355 ScholiaQ58341355MaRDI QIDQ370963FDOQ370963

Authors: Bonifacio Llamazares 

Publication date: 20 September 2013

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/36226

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zbMATH Keywords

absolute majorityPareto majoritysimple majorityunanimous majorityvoting systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• The forgotten decision rules: majority rules based on difference of votes
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• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
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• Maskin monotonic aggregation rules
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• Parallel axiomatizations of majority and unanimity
• Majority Voting and Social Choice
• Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach
• Single profile of preferences with variable societies: a characterization of simple majority rule

Cited In (8)

• Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice
• Beyond neutrality: extended difference of votes rules
• On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
• A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model
• Anonymity, monotonicity, and quota pair systems
• Qualified voting systems
• Classification aggregation without unanimity
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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