Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
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Publication:1296477
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00036-XzbMATH Open0958.91012MaRDI QIDQ1296477FDOQ1296477
Authors: Dolors Berga 
Publication date: 16 April 2001
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
- Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
Cited In (26)
- Social Choice Theory
- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
- Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
- Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness
- A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules
- Single-plateaued choice
- Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
- Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued.
- Public decisions: solidarity and the status quo
- (Large) finite to continuum: an approximation result for electoral competition models
- Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
- ON STRATEGY‐PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- Representing a sequential allotment rule in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of multicriteria active expertise
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
- Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
- On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference
- Fuzzy politics. I: The genesis of parties
- Optimal Strategies and Utility-Based Prices Converge When Agents’ Preferences Do
- Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies
- Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules.
- Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
- Single-basined choice
- Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness
- Resource allocation mechanisms based on strategy-proof symmetrical anonymous voting procedures with delegation
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