Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1296477
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00036-XzbMath0958.91012MaRDI QIDQ1296477
Publication date: 16 April 2001
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
strategy-proofness; voting schemes; strategy-proof voting schemes; provision of one pure public good; single-plateaued preferences
91B14: Social choice
Related Items
Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem, Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers, Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences, Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good, Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences, Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies, Public decisions: solidarity and the status quo
Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
- Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
