Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences

Cites Work

Generalized median voter schemes and committees
Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods

Cited In (26)

Social Choice Theory
Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness
A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules
Single-plateaued choice
Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued.
Public decisions: solidarity and the status quo
(Large) finite to continuum: an approximation result for electoral competition models
Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
ON STRATEGY‐PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS
Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
Representing a sequential allotment rule in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of multicriteria active expertise
Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference
Fuzzy politics. I: The genesis of parties
Optimal Strategies and Utility-Based Prices Converge When Agents’ Preferences Do
Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies
Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules.
Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
Single-basined choice
Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness
Resource allocation mechanisms based on strategy-proof symmetrical anonymous voting procedures with delegation

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