Resource allocation mechanisms based on strategy-proof symmetrical anonymous voting procedures with delegation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:386935
DOI10.1134/S0005117913090117zbMATH Open1277.91102MaRDI QIDQ386935FDOQ386935
Authors: V. N. Bondarik, N. A. Korgin 
Publication date: 11 December 2013
Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Recommendations
- Equivalence and strategy-proofness of no anonymous priority resource allocation mechanisms
- Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources
- An efficient solution of the resource allotment problem with the Groves-Ledyard mechanism under transferable utility
- Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Voting theory (91B12)
Cites Work
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
- Use of intersection property for analysis of feasibility of multicriteria expertise results
- Application of generalized median voter schemes to designing strategy-proof mechanisms of multicriteria active expertise
This page was built for publication: Resource allocation mechanisms based on strategy-proof symmetrical anonymous voting procedures with delegation
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q386935)
