Resource allocation mechanisms based on strategy-proof symmetrical anonymous voting procedures with delegation

DOI10.1134/S0005117913090117MaRDI QIDQ386935zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors V. N. Bondarik, N. A. Korgin

Publication date 11 December 2013

Published in Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Equivalence and strategy-proofness of no anonymous priority resource allocation mechanisms
• Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources
• An efficient solution of the resource allotment problem with the Groves-Ledyard mechanism under transferable utility
• Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
• Strategy-proof allotment rules

Cites work

• Application of generalized median voter schemes to designing strategy-proof mechanisms of multicriteria active expertise
• Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
• Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• Use of intersection property for analysis of feasibility of multicriteria expertise results

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