Resource allocation mechanisms based on strategy-proof symmetrical anonymous voting procedures with delegation

DOI10.1134/S0005117913090117zbMATH Open1277.91102MaRDI QIDQ386935FDOQ386935

V. N. Bondarik, N. A. Korgin

Publication date: 11 December 2013

Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
• Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
• Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
• Use of intersection property for analysis of feasibility of multicriteria expertise results
• Application of generalized median voter schemes to designing strategy-proof mechanisms of multicriteria active expertise

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