Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(00)00059-7zbMath1017.91069WikidataQ114656217 ScholiaQ114656217MaRDI QIDQ5932336

Lars Ehlers

Publication date: 26 August 2003

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

independence of irrelevant alternativespublic goodssingled peaked preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Individual preferences (91B08) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Related Items (5)

Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules. ⋮ The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks ⋮ Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences ⋮ Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle ⋮ Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: Replacement principle

Cites Work

• Strategy-proof location on a network
• The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
• A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
• The structure of non-manipulable social choice rules on a tree
• Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
• Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
• Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
• Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods

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