Truth, justice, and cake cutting

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.009zbMath1274.91262OpenAlexW2137921611WikidataQ59663877 ScholiaQ59663877MaRDI QIDQ380933

Yiling Chen, Ariel D. Procaccia, John K. Lai, David C. Parkes

Publication date: 14 November 2013

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.252.4001

zbMATH Keywords

fair divisionstrategy-proofnessmechanism designcake cuttingenvy-freenessmaximum flows

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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