Worst-case mechanism design via Bayesian analysis
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Recommendations
- Budget feasible mechanism design, from prior-free to Bayesian
- Budget-feasible mechanism design for non-monotone submodular objectives: offline and online
- On the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms
- Simple and efficient budget feasible mechanisms for monotone submodular valuations
- Budget feasible procurement auctions
Cites work
- A note on maximizing a submodular set function subject to a knapsack constraint
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
- Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
- Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
- Bayesian incentive compatibility via fractional assignments
- Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
- Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
- Budget feasible mechanism design, from prior-free to Bayesian
- Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
- Competitive auctions
- From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms, toward optimal combinatorial auctions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5485518 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1929535 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentives in Teams
- Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
- Knapsack auctions
- Matroids, secretary problems, and online mechanisms
- Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
- On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive
- On optimal single-item auctions
- On the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy
- Optimization with demand oracles
- Revenue maximization with a single sample
- Secretary problems: weights and discounts
- Selling privacy at auction
- Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
- The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
- Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
- Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding
Cited in
(17)- Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
- Simple and efficient budget feasible mechanisms for monotone submodular valuations
- Beyond the worst-case analysis of random priority: smoothed and average-case approximation ratios in mechanism design
- Truthful multi-unit procurements with budgets
- Coverage, matching, and beyond: new results on budgeted mechanism design
- Multi-parameter mechanism design under budget and matroid constraints
- On budget-feasible mechanism design for symmetric submodular objectives
- Budget feasible procurement auctions
- On the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms
- Bayesian Mechanism Design
- Budget feasible mechanisms for experimental design
- Budget feasible mechanism design, from prior-free to Bayesian
- Budget-feasible mechanism design for non-monotone submodular objectives: offline and online
- Partial allocations in budget-feasible mechanism design: bridging multiple levels of service and divisible agents
- Striking the balance: optimizing pricing schemes for time-sensitive buyers
- Budget-feasible mechanism design: simpler, better mechanisms and general payment constraints
- Efficient and effective budget-feasible mechanisms for submodular valuations
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