Selling privacy at auction

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.013zbMath1318.91093arXiv1011.1375OpenAlexW1965093697MaRDI QIDQ2347786

Aaron Roth, Arpita Ghosh

Publication date: 8 June 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1011.1375

zbMATH Keywords

privacymechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (13)

An incentive mechanism for trading personal data in data markets ⋮ Establishing the price of privacy in federated data trading ⋮ Mechanism design for demand management in energy communities ⋮ Reproducibility and transparency versus privacy and confidentiality: reflections from a data editor ⋮ Buying Data from Privacy-Aware Individuals: The Effect of Negative Payments ⋮ Data curation from privacy-aware agents ⋮ On the behavioral implications of differential privacy ⋮ Privacy in implementation ⋮ A Differential Privacy Mechanism that Accounts for Network Effects for Crowdsourcing Systems ⋮ The Empirical Implications of Privacy-Aware Choice ⋮ Is your privacy for sale? An experiment on the willingness to reveal sensitive information ⋮ Worst-Case Mechanism Design via Bayesian Analysis ⋮ Privacy, patience, and protection

Uses Software

• SuLQ

Cites Work

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• On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
• Is privacy compatible with truthfulness?
• Differential Privacy: A Survey of Results
• Universally utility-maximizing privacy mechanisms
• Impossibility of Differentially Private Universally Optimal Mechanisms
• Theory of Cryptography

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