Redrawing the boundaries on purchasing data from privacy-sensitive individuals

DOI10.1145/2554797.2554835zbMATH Open1366.91094arXiv1401.4092OpenAlexW2162191171WikidataQ59379634 ScholiaQ59379634MaRDI QIDQ2988895FDOQ2988895

Authors: Kobbi Nissim, David Xiao, Salil Vadhan 

Publication date: 19 May 2017

Published in: Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We prove new positive and negative results concerning the existence of truthful and individually rational mechanisms for purchasing private data from individuals with unbounded and sensitive privacy preferences. We strengthen the impossibility results of Ghosh and Roth (EC 2011) by extending it to a much wider class of privacy valuations. In particular, these include privacy valuations that are based on ({epsilon}, {delta})-differentially private mechanisms for non-zero {delta}, ones where the privacy costs are measured in a per-database manner (rather than taking the worst case), and ones that do not depend on the payments made to players (which might not be observable to an adversary). To bypass this impossibility result, we study a natural special setting where individuals have mono- tonic privacy valuations, which captures common contexts where certain values for private data are expected to lead to higher valuations for privacy (e.g. having a particular disease). We give new mech- anisms that are individually rational for all players with monotonic privacy valuations, truthful for all players whose privacy valuations are not too large, and accurate if there are not too many players with too-large privacy valuations. We also prove matching lower bounds showing that in some respects our mechanism cannot be improved significantly.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.4092

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zbMATH Keywords

differential privacymechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

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Cited In (5)

• Selling privacy at auction
• Accuracy for sale: aggregating data with a variance constraint
• The empirical implications of privacy-aware choice
• Optimized, direct sale of privacy in personal data marketplaces
• Buying data from privacy-aware individuals: the effect of negative payments

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