scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5343728
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Publication:3524722
Cited in
(11)- Selling privacy at auction
- The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
- On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem
- Prior-free multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders
- Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions
- Pricing lotteries
- Bounding the optimal revenue of selling multiple goods
- Automated design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions
- Profit maximization mitigates competition
- Optimal design of profit sharing rates by FFT
- Reverse auctions are different from auctions
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