Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
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Cited in
(47)- Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
- Welfare maximization with friends-of-friends network externalities
- On envy-free revenue approximation for combinatorial buyers with budgets
- Approximating Nash social welfare under binary XOS and binary subadditive valuations
- Learning in auctions: regret is hard, envy is easy
- A survey of approximability and inapproximability results for social welfare optimization in multiagent resource allocation
- Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
- Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement
- A generic truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions
- Expected time complexity of the auction algorithm and the push relabel algorithm for maximum bipartite matching on random graphs
- Envy-free revenue approximation for asymmetric buyers with budgets
- Approximation algorithms for a winner determination problem of single-item multi-unit auctions
- On bidding algorithms for a distributed combinatorial auction
- On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources
- Computing stable coalitions: approximation algorithms for reward sharing
- Combinatorial auctions with conflict-based externalities
- Oblivious Medians Via Online Bidding
- Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
- On the computational power of demand queries
- Approximation Algorithms for k-Duplicates Combinatorial Auctions with Subadditive Bidders
- Online submodular welfare maximization: greedy beats 1/2 in random order
- On simultaneous two-player combinatorial auctions
- An Efficient Winner Approximation for a Series of Combinatorial Auctions
- Worst-case mechanism design via Bayesian analysis
- A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements
- When are welfare guarantees robust?
- A new approximation guarantee for monotone submodular function maximization via discrete convexity
- Lower bounds for approximating graph parameters via communication complexity
- On the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism for divisible resources
- Separating the communication complexity of truthful and nontruthful algorithms for combinatorial auctions
- On the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
- An Experimental Study of the Misdirection Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions
- Sketching valuation functions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7651150 (Why is no real title available?)
- Bayesian combinatorial auctions
- Two-stage submodular maximization under knapsack and matroid constraints
- Improved maximin guarantees for subadditive and fractionally subadditive fair allocation problem
- Fractionally Subadditive Maximization under an Incremental Knapsack Constraint with Applications to Incremental Flows
- Approximating Nash social welfare by matching and local search
- Maximize liquid welfare in combinatorial auctions with monotone valuations
- Combinatorial auctions with interdependent valuations: SOS to the rescue
- Prophet secretary for combinatorial auctions and matroids
- Communication complexity of discrete fair division
- Sublinear approximation algorithm for Nash social welfare with XOS valuations
- Approximation algorithm and mechanism design for bisubmodular welfare maximization problem
- Title not available (Why is no real title available?)
- Inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions
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