scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7651150
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Publication:5874477
DOI10.4230/LIPICS.ESA.2020.11MaRDI QIDQ5874477FDOQ5874477
Authors: Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar, Anand Krishna, Ranjani G. Sundaram
Publication date: 7 February 2023
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.07370
Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)
Cites Work
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Cited In (11)
- A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness
- Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations
- Improved maximin guarantees for subadditive and fractionally subadditive fair allocation problem
- Dividing good and great items among agents with bivalued submodular valuations
- Online Nash welfare maximization without predictions
- Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Submodular Valuations through (Un)Matchings
- Approximating Nash social welfare under binary XOS and binary subadditive valuations
- Fair Division of Indivisible Goods for a Class of Concave Valuations
- Fair and efficient allocation with few agent types, few item types, or small value levels
- Approximating Nash social welfare by matching and local search
- Fair division of indivisible goods: recent progress and open questions
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