On fair division for indivisible items

DOI10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2018.25OpenAlexW2962812754MaRDI QIDQ5090961

Naveen Garg, Bhaskar Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Kurt Mehlhorn, Yun Kuen Cheung, Martin Hoefer

Publication date: 21 July 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.06232

zbMATH Keywords

envy-freefair divisionindivisible goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical aspects of software engineering (specification, verification, metrics, requirements, etc.) (68N30) Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Related Items (8)

An additive approximation scheme for the Nash social welfare maximization with identical additive valuations ⋮ Fair Division of Indivisible Goods for a Class of Concave Valuations ⋮ Computing fair and efficient allocations with few utility values ⋮ Existence of EFX for two additive valuations ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Computing fair and efficient allocations with few utility values ⋮ A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness ⋮ Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Submodular Valuations through (Un)Matchings

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Certifying algorithms
• Welfare bounds in the fair division problem
• APX-hardness of maximizing Nash social welfare with indivisible items
• Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items
• The Bargaining Problem
• Consensus of Subjective Probabilities: The Pari-Mutuel Method
• Theoretical Improvements in Algorithmic Efficiency for Network Flow Problems
• Nash Social Welfare for Indivisible Items under Separable, Piecewise-Linear Concave Utilities
• Nash Social Welfare, Matrix Permanent, and Stable Polynomials

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