On simultaneous two-player combinatorial auctions
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Recommendations
- Separating the communication complexity of truthful and nontruthful algorithms for combinatorial auctions
- Communication complexity of combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations
- On the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
- Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
- Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
Cited in
(8)- Economic efficiency requires interaction
- Market Equilibrium for Combinatorial Auctions and the Matching Core of Nonnegative TU Games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5788419 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the Economic Efficiency of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
- Separating the communication complexity of truthful and nontruthful algorithms for combinatorial auctions
- Note on an Auction Procedure for a Matching Game in Polynomial Time
- Algorithms - ESA 2003
- Improved truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders
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