Quantum communication complexity of classical auctions
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Cites work
- A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
- A stable marriage requires communication
- Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementation in the independent private-values model
- Bounding the menu-size of approximately optimal auctions via optimal-transport duality
- Breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders
- Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria
- Communication complexity of combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations
- Communication complexity of correlated equilibrium with small support
- Communication complexity of discrete fair division
- Communication complexity of Nash equilibrium in potential games (extended abstract)
- Economic efficiency requires interaction
- Exponential communication separations between notions of selfishness
- Exponential Separation for One-Way Quantum Communication Complexity, with Applications to Cryptography
- Exponential separation of quantum and classical communication complexity
- Exponential separation of quantum and classical one-way communication complexity
- Haggling over substitutes
- How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5899305 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5485520 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3497764 (Why is no real title available?)
- Interdomain Routing and Games
- Interpolating between truthful and non-truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
- Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
- Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
- MIP* = RE
- Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
- Near-optimal communication lower bounds for approximate Nash equilibria
- NEEXP is contained in MIP
- On simultaneous two-player combinatorial auctions
- On the communication complexity of approximate fixed points
- On the complexity of optimal lottery pricing and randomized mechanisms
- On the hardness of dominant strategy mechanism design
- Optimal mechanism for selling two goods
- Pricing randomized allocations
- Proposed experiment to test local hidden-variable theories
- PSPACE has constant-round quantum interactive proof systems
- Quantum Games and Quantum Strategies
- Quantum one-way communication can be exponentially stronger than classical communication
- Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity
- Selling two goods optimally
- Separating the communication complexity of truthful and non-truthful combinatorial auctions
- Settling the communication complexity of combinatorial auctions with two subadditive buyers
- Settling the sample complexity of single-parameter revenue maximization
- Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
- The communication burden of payment determination
- The communication complexity of local search
- The communication complexity of payment computation
- The communication cost of selfishness
- The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
- The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation
- The Quantum Communication Complexity of Sampling
- The randomized communication complexity of randomized auctions
- The sample complexity of up-to- multi-dimensional revenue maximization
- Voting almost maximizes social welfare despite limited communication
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