A stable marriage requires communication
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Publication:2278950
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.013zbMath1429.91232arXiv1405.7709OpenAlexW2965885938MaRDI QIDQ2278950
Will Rosenbaum, Noam Nisan, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Rafail Ostrovsky
Publication date: 12 December 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.7709
Related Items (4)
Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems ⋮ Complexity of stability in trading networks ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Lazy Gale-Shapley for many-to-one matching with partial information
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