Voting almost maximizes social welfare despite limited communication
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Publication:646516
DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2011.03.005zbMATH Open1228.68053OpenAlexW1996008403MaRDI QIDQ646516FDOQ646516
Authors: I. Caragiannis, Ariel D. Procaccia
Publication date: 17 November 2011
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2011.03.005
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Cited In (20)
- Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World
- Proportional Borda allocations
- The distortion of distributed metric social choice
- The distortion of distributed metric social choice
- Voting with limited information and many alternatives
- Peeking behind the ordinal curtain: improving distortion via cardinal queries
- Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
- More effort towards multiagent knapsack
- How good is a two-party election game?
- Borda-induced hedonic games with friends, enemies, and neutral players
- Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
- Truthful ownership transfer with expert advice
- The distortion of distributed voting
- Awareness of voter passion greatly improves the distortion of metric social choice
- Multi-agent Systems and Voting: How Similar Are Voting Procedures
- Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view
- Equilibria in Doodle polls under three tie-breaking rules
- Approximating optimal social choice under metric preferences
- The distortion of distributed voting
- The metric distortion of multiwinner voting
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