Algorithms - ESA 2003

DOI10.1007/B13632MaRDI QIDQ5897238zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Liad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan, I. R. Segal'

Publication date 3 March 2010

Published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/b13632

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5547873
• Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
• The randomized communication complexity of randomized auctions
• The communication complexity of private value single-item auctions
• Communication complexity of combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations
• Communication-proof equilibria in cheap-talk games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1248146
• On simultaneous two-player combinatorial auctions
• Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction

Cited in

(13)

• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Fraction auctions: the tradeoff between efficiency and running time
• On the fastest Vickrey algorithm
• Asymptotically optimal communication in simple mechanisms
• Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case
• The communication complexity of private value single-item auctions
• (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1696667 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5547873 (Why is no real title available?)
• Communication and efficiency in auctions
• Asking questions
• Auction design with costly preference elicitation
• Auctioning bulk mobile messages

This page was built for publication: Algorithms - ESA 2003

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5897238)