Recommendations
Cites work
- A note on Matsushima's regularity condition
- A Note on the Characterization of Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences
- Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
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- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
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Cited in
(10)- Fundamental theory of institutions: a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz
- The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
- Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- Bayesian implementation: The necessity of infinite mechanisms
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- Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz
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- Bernoulli Factories and Black-box Reductions in Mechanism Design
- Bayesian Mechanism Design
- A method for eliciting utilities and its application to collective choice
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