Some remarks on Bayesian mechanism design
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Publication:5111103
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_6zbMATH Open1443.91091OpenAlexW2948008923MaRDI QIDQ5111103FDOQ5111103
Authors: Cl. d'Aspremont, Jacques Crémer 
Publication date: 26 May 2020
Published in: Studies in Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_6
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Cited In (10)
- Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz
- A method for eliciting utilities and its application to collective choice
- Bayesian implementation: The necessity of infinite mechanisms
- Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
- Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- Fundamental theory of institutions: a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz
- Bayesian Mechanism Design
- The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
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- Bernoulli Factories and Black-box Reductions in Mechanism Design
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