Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case
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Publication:3354437
DOI10.2307/2938354zbMath0729.90030OpenAlexW2017669196MaRDI QIDQ3354437
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Publication date: 1990
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2938354
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