Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.10.005MaRDI QIDQ2370489zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date 26 June 2007

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2002/2002cf185.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

auctions with risk-averse principalbudget balancingfull surplus extractionincentive compatibilityinterim individual rationalityiterative dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A note on Matsushima's regularity condition
• A Sequential Solution to the Public Goods Problem
• Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
• Bayesian monotonicity with side payments
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance
• Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information
• Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case
• Efficient allocation with continuous quantities
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Game theory
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3121285 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability
• Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms
• Incentives in Teams
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Pollution claim settlements under private information
• Some Limitations of Virtual Bayesian Implementation
• Virtual Bayesian Implementation
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Virtual implementation in separable Bayesian environments using simple mechanisms

Cited in

(8)

• Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
• Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
• Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade
• Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
• Some remarks on Bayesian mechanism design
• Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information
• Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
• Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies

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