Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2370489
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.10.005zbMath1280.91086OpenAlexW3023692300MaRDI QIDQ2370489
Publication date: 26 June 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2002/2002cf185.pdf
incentive compatibilityfull surplus extractionbudget balancinginterim individual rationalityiterative dominanceauctions with risk-averse principal
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items
Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade ⋮ Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information ⋮ Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design ⋮ Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus ⋮ Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies ⋮ Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces ⋮ Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information
- Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms
- Efficient allocation with continuous quantities
- Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability
- Pollution claim settlements under private information
- Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance
- Bayesian monotonicity with side payments
- A note on Matsushima's regularity condition
- Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
- Virtual implementation in separable Bayesian environments using simple mechanisms
- Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- A Sequential Solution to the Public Goods Problem
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Incentives in Teams
- Virtual Bayesian Implementation
- Some Limitations of Virtual Bayesian Implementation
