Virtual implementation in separable Bayesian environments using simple mechanisms

DOI10.1006/GAME.1995.1010zbMATH Open0835.90002OpenAlexW2003411444MaRDI QIDQ1893371FDOQ1893371

Authors: Anil Arya, Jonathani Glover, Richard A. Young 

Publication date: 28 April 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1010

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zbMATH Keywords

mechanismssocial choice functionsBayesian environments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cited In (4)

• Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
• Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
• A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
• Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance

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