Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection

DOI10.1006/JETH.2000.2648MaRDI QIDQ1584555zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anil Arya, Uday Rajan, Jonathani Glover

Publication date 2000

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2648

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Review text

This paper studies implementation in a principal-agent model of adverse selection. We explore ways in which the additional structure of principal-agent models (compared to general implementation models) simplifies the implementation problem. We develop a connection between the single crossing property and monotonicity conditions which are necessary for Nash and Bayesian Nash implementation. We also construct simple implementing mechanisms that rely on the single crossing property and on assumptions about the outcome set frequently made in the principal-agent literature.

Recommendations

• Implementation of optimal contracts under adverse selection
• A general existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection
• On the implementability of contracts without quasilinear utility
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
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Cites work

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Cited in

(8)

• Ignorance in a multi-agent setting
• Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard
• Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• The implementation duality
• A general existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection
• Safe implementation
• Ex post implementation

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