Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection

DOI10.1006/JETH.2000.2648MaRDI QIDQ1584555zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anil Arya, Uday Rajan, Jonathani Glover

Publication date 2000

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2648

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Implementation of optimal contracts under adverse selection
• A general existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection
• On the implementability of contracts without quasilinear utility
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Interactive implementation

Cites work

• A simple forecasting mechanism for moral hazard settings
• A simpler mechanism that stops agents from cheating
• Bayesian Implementation
• Bayesian implementation: The necessity of infinite mechanisms
• Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
• Implementation of first-best allocations via generalized tax schedules
• Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Implementing action profiles when agents collude
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Multi-Product Quantity-Dependent Prices and Profitability Constraints
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
• Regularity and Stability of Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games
• Stopping agents from ``cheating
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
• Virtual Bayesian Implementation
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Virtual implementation in separable Bayesian environments using simple mechanisms

Cited in

(7)

• The implementation duality
• Ignorance in a multi-agent setting
• A general existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection
• Ex post implementation
• Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard

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