Virtual implementation in separable Bayesian environments using simple mechanisms

DOI10.1006/GAME.1995.1010MaRDI QIDQ1893371zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anil Arya, Jonathani Glover, Richard A. Young

Publication date 28 April 1996

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1010

zbMATH Keywords

mechanismssocial choice functionsBayesian environments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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(4)

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• Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance

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