On the implementability of contracts without quasilinear utility
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Publication:1925675
Recommendations
- Implementation of optimal contracts under adverse selection
- Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition
- Nonparametric adverse selection problems
- Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection
- On the existence of optimal contract mechanisms for incomplete information principal-agent models
Cites work
- A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4029228 (Why is no real title available?)
- Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening
- Monotonicity in direct revelation mechanisms
- Non-smooth monotonicity constraints in optimal control problems: some economic applications
Cited in
(9)- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
- Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types
- Implementability with contingent contracts
- Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments
- Noisy Observation in Adverse Selection Models
- Implementation with contingent contracts
- The implementation duality
- Implementation in dynamic job transfers
- Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition
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