Noisy Observation in Adverse Selection Models

DOI10.2307/2297866MaRDI QIDQ4008557zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 27 September 1992

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/1904/1/noisy.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selection modelsincomplete informationnoisy observationprincipal-agent contracting problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14) Hierarchical systems (93A13)

Recommendations

• Robust contracting with additive noise
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(10)

• Value of communication in agencies
• Regulation of a risk averse firm
• Optimal incentives for teams: a multiscale decision theory approach
• Convolution and composition of totally positive random variables in economics
• On the generalized principal-agent problem: a comment
• Robust contracting with additive noise
• Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard
• Implementing deterministic outcomes in stochastic dynamic environments
• Robust sourcing contract design for the manufacturer under supply risk
• Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?

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