Value of communication in agencies

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90023-9zbMath0669.90002OpenAlexW1989243247MaRDI QIDQ1119137

Nahum D. Melumad, Stefan Reichelstein

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90023-9

zbMATH Keywords

private informationprincipal-agent problemself-selectionagency modelinformational economics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Related Items

Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard ⋮ Delegated contracting, information, and internal control ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules ⋮ State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics ⋮ A dynamic model of supplier switching ⋮ Regulation of a risk averse firm ⋮ Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all? ⋮ Agency in a market setting ⋮ Pessimistic information gathering

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Eliciting production possibilities from a well-informed manager
• Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Noisy Observation in Adverse Selection Models
• Managerial Incentives, Investment and Aggregate Implications: Scale Effects
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
• Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations