Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90161-3MaRDI QIDQ795703zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors David E. M. Sappington

Publication date 1984

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90161-3

zbMATH Keywords

principalasymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledgeefficient outcomeincentive contractingPareto optimal contractrisk-neutral agent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Mathematical economics (91B99)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3547015 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3807309 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3068103 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Optimal Nonuniform Prices
• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information

Cited in

(16)

• Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs
• Incentive compatible contractible information
• Information Asymmetry, Participation, and Long-Term Contracts
• The virtue of being underestimated: A note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models
• Optimal contracting with private knowledge of wealth and ability
• Payoff implications of incentive contracting
• Agency in a market setting
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
• Value of communication in agencies
• When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships
• Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1908198 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentive compatible contractible information
• Optimal contracting and the organization of knowledge
• The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegration

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