Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge
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Publication:795703
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90161-3zbMath0542.90021MaRDI QIDQ795703
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90161-3
principal; asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge; efficient outcome; incentive contracting; Pareto optimal contract; risk-neutral agent
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Value of communication in agencies, Agency in a market setting, The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegration
Cites Work
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