Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3547015 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3807309 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3068103 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
- Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
- Optimal Nonuniform Prices
- Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
- Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
Cited in
(16)- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
- Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
- Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1908198 (Why is no real title available?)
- Payoff implications of incentive contracting
- Information Asymmetry, Participation, and Long-Term Contracts
- Incentive compatible contractible information
- Agency in a market setting
- Optimal contracting and the organization of knowledge
- Optimal contracting with private knowledge of wealth and ability
- When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships
- The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegration
- Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs
- Value of communication in agencies
- Incentive compatible contractible information
- The virtue of being underestimated: A note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models
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