Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90161-3zbMATH Open0542.90021OpenAlexW1966516819MaRDI QIDQ795703FDOQ795703

Authors: David E. M. Sappington 

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90161-3

Recommendations

• Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs
• The optimal price decision and incentive contract design under asymmetric information
• Contracting under incomplete information and social preferences: an experimental study
• Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion
• Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information
• Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
• Optimal contracting with private knowledge of wealth and ability
• On the existence of optimal contract mechanisms for incomplete information principal-agent models
• Incentive contracting with hidden choices of effort and risk
• Incentive contract in supply chain with asymmetric information

zbMATH Keywords

principalasymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledgeefficient outcomeincentive contractingPareto optimal contractrisk-neutral agent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Mathematical economics (91B99)

Cites Work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Optimal Nonuniform Prices

Cited In (12)

• Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Information Asymmetry, Participation, and Long-Term Contracts
• Incentive compatible contractible information
• Agency in a market setting
• Optimal contracting with private knowledge of wealth and ability
• When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships
• The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegration
• Value of communication in agencies
• Incentive compatible contractible information
• The virtue of being underestimated: A note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values

This page was built for publication: Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q795703)