The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegration

DOI10.1016/0377-2217(95)00068-2zbMATH Open0902.90030OpenAlexW2093038453MaRDI QIDQ1390201FDOQ1390201

Authors: Heike Y. Schenk-Mathes 

Publication date: 14 July 1998

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(95)00068-2

Recommendations

• Designing supply contracts: contract type and information asymmetry
• Contract design in a cross-sales supply chain with demand information asymmetry
• Designing structured supply contracts under demand and price uncertainty in an open supply chain
• Analysis of supply contracts with quantity flexibility
• Relating the multiple supply problem to quantity flexibility contracts
• Designing contracts for a closed-loop supply chain under information asymmetry
• Coordination contract of supply chains and its optimal decision when demands rely on price
• Design of contract parameters in a closed-loop supply chain
• Contract design under asymmetric demand information for sustainable supply chain practices
• Competitive contract design in a retail supply chain under demand uncertainty

zbMATH Keywords

information asymmetryhierarchical planningdesign of a supply contractself-selection models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge
• Hierarchical structures in organizations: A conceptual framework

Cited In (8)

• Relating the multiple supply problem to quantity flexibility contracts
• Optimal contract design of supplier-led outsourcing based on Pontryagin maximum principle
• Hierarchical structures in organizations: A conceptual framework
• Coordinating decentralized linear programs by exchange of primal information
• A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information.
• Analysis of supply contracts with minimum total order quantity commitments and non-stationary demands
• Guaranteeing agreements and operating compensation for slippage in supply of raw materials. II: Active compensation and the worst perturbations
• The organization of supplier networks: effects of delegation and intermediation.

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